Abstract. Safety assessment of new air traffic management systems is a main issue for civil aviation authorities. Standard techniques such as testing and simulation have serious limitations in new systems that are significantly more autonomous than the older ones. In this paper, we present an innovative approach for establishing the correctness of conflict detection systems. Fundamental to our approach is the concept of trajectory, and how we represent a continuous physical trajectory by a continuous path in the x-y plane constrained by physical laws and operational requirements. From the model of trajectories, we extract, and formally prove, high-level properties that can serve as a framework to analyze conflict scenarios. We use the AILS (Airborne Information for Lateral Spacing) alerting algorithm as a case study of our approach.
Introduction
Historically, the adoption of new technology is a slow process in the aviation industry. New technology concepts are developed within the bounds of existing operational procedures and must be accepted by aircraft operators, regulators, and air space controllers. The implementation of new concepts goes through strict regulatory guidelines for design, development, and validation. It is in part because of this bureaucratic and slow process that the airline industry has achieved a relatively high-level of safety and reliability. New concepts and designs are subjected to a validation process which is based mostly on real-time human-in-the-loop simulation and testing, but which also includes the development of operational procedures and training. In this paradigm, system malfunctions and failures are handled by backup systems, human intervention, or both. The current global Air Traffic Management (ATM) system consists of complex interactions among airborne systems, ground-based systems, flight crews, and human controllers. It aims to achieve a smooth and safe flow of air traffic in the airspace. The specific functions of the global ATM system evolves within the context of regulatory agencies, economical constraints, social mechanisms, enabling technology, and safety requirements. Over the past 20 years, automation in Air Traffic Management has been mostly relegated to an advisory role. Ground-based systems such as TRUST (Terminal Routing Using Speedcontrol Techniques) [3] , FAST (Final Approach Spacing Tool) [5] , and CTAS (Center TRACON Automation System) [7] assist human controllers by providing sequencing and vectoring information for air traffic in terminal areas. Airborne collision alerting and avoidance systems such as AILS (Airborne Information for Lateral Spacing) [15] and TCAS (Traffic and Collision Avoidance System) [16] are also advisory in nature. Validation of these systems has been accomplished by extensive simulation and testing. Field trials have also been conducted to evaluate their performance and reliability.
Due to the desire of improving efficiency in an increasingly congested airspace, new concepts are being proposed which radically depart from existing operational procedures. Concepts such as Safe Flight 21 [17] , DAG-TM (Distributed Air/Ground Air Traffic Management) [1] , and Free Flight [14] move from a groundcentralized approach to an airborne-distributed paradigm. If these new concepts are to be adopted, some of the safeguards, which were built according to the old operational procedures, will no longer exist. Flight crews, assisted by on-board systems, will have more or all of the responsibility for air traffic separation, weather avoidance, flight plan changes, and sequencing and merging. Guidance, navigation, and control systems on board aircraft will have a higher level of automation. Therefore, a higher level of assurance will be required for these systems in terms of reliability, availability, and correctness. The verification of correctness of new concepts and systems represents a challenge to existing methods. Given the critical nature of the problem, we believe that rigorous verification methods and mathematical analysis should be employed and that such analysis should be mechanically checked via a theorem proving system, or other automated proving techniques such as model-checking.
In this paper, we use Formal Methods for the verification of conflict detection algorithms. In particular, we study the correctness of the AILS (Airborne Information for Lateral Spacing) [15] system. AILS, which is an alerting system for independent parallel landing under Instrument Meteorological Conditions, has been extensively simulated and tested by NASA researchers. So far, no major flaws have been found. However, neither testing nor simulation can guarantee the absence of logical errors in its design.
An air-traffic control system, such as a conflict detection algorithm, is a hybrid system. It consists of simultaneous discrete and continuous behaviors. The discrete behavior is inherent to the algorithmic implementation on an embedded digital computer, whereas the continuous behavior arises from the kinematics of the aircraft. It is, of course, always possible to discretize the continuous trajectory of an aircraft, approximating it by discrete segments of trajectories. Discretization of continuous trajectories allows the definition of trajectories by a transition relation. This way, aircraft trajectory properties can be rephrased as reachability problems in finite state automata and they can be established by model checking and/or theorem proving. This approach has been often used in the literature to model air traffic control problems (for a list of works, see [18] ). The technique has been shown to be effective for modeling systems where control logic modes trigger continuous and dynamic changes of the state. For instance, the TCAS alerting system for preventing midair collision was modeled in [10] using a hybrid automata approach.
In a previous effort to verify the AILS algorithm [4] , we have experimented with discrete and semi-discrete models of aircraft trajectories. In the discrete model, the space is divided into cells and a trajectory is a list of adjacent cells representing the movement of an aircraft in time-steps. The semi-discrete model uses continuous variables and functions to describe aircraft states and trajectories. The time, however, is incremented in time-steps. It is well-known that the correctness of the result depends on the choice of the discretization. In our case, we proved properties in the discrete model that were inaccurate with respect to a model where space and time are continuous. Inaccuracies can be minimized by reducing sample sizes and rates. Unfortunately, the smaller the discretization error, the bigger the state space. Usually the state space grows exponentially, and this may raise tractability problems when using state exploration techniques. Furthermore, discretization makes it impossible to take advantage of many useful properties of elementary calculus, which are valid only for continuous mathematics. Finally, introducing such a discretization of time and/or space usually complicate the reasoning. It is more difficult, for instance, to reason about floating point numbers, where properties such as associativity do not hold, than about real numbers.
We propose an innovative approach, based on the formalization of continuous mathematics within a higherorder logic framework, for establishing the correctness of conflict detection systems. Although AILS will be our running example, the formal framework we present in this paper is rather general and has been used to prove properties of other avionics systems [6] . The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Sect. 2, we introduce a key concept in our approach: aircraft trajectories. In our higher-order logic formalization, a trajectory is a continuous path in the x-y plane constrained by physical laws and operational requirements. Using standard calculus, geometry, and kinematics, we prove mathematical properties of continuous trajectories. The main aspects of this formal development are illustrated in Sect. 3. As an example of the application of our approach, we show, in Sect. 4 , that the AILS alerting algorithm is correct, i.e., (1) there is no possible conflict between two aircraft without a prior alarm; and (2) the time between an alarm and a potential conflict is at least 10 s. We also show that the AILS alerting algorithm is not certain, i.e., false alarms can be issued. The last section summarizes our work and contains concluding remarks.
Through this paper, and for readability reasons, we have used standard mathematics and traditional logic notation. Nevertheless, our development has been formally checked in the general verification system PVS [13] . See [11] for an extended version of this paper. All the PVS theories and proofs are available at: http://shemesh. larc.nasa.gov/fm/ftp/ails/.
Aircraft trajectories
In our model, an aircraft trajectory is a continuous path in the x-y (horizontal) plane subject to constraints imposed by the aircraft dynamics. The vertical plane is not considered, since vertical separation is typically handled separately. Formally, a trajectory is composed of five differentiable functions θ, x, y, φ, v in R → R, which map time into heading, x-y position, bank angle, and ground speed of the aircraft, respectively. A common operational assumption, that we acknowledge, is that aircraft are moving at constant speed. Hence, the velocity vector is completely determined by the ground speed (constant v) and the heading of the aircraft (polar angle θ). According to physical laws, the variation of the heading is proportional to the tangent of the bank angle φ of the aircraft. Therefore, we have the following constraints on θ, x, y, φ, v:
(1)
Equations (1) and (2) state that the derivative of the position functions yields the speed components of the aircraft. Equation (3) relates the bank angle with the heading of the aircraft. That equation states that the rate of direction change of an aircraft is proportional to the tangent of the bank angle by a factor of g/v, where g is the gravitational force. In addition to the above physical constraints, we take a maximum bank angle operational constraint for commercial aircraft to be 35
Henceforth, we use the constant MaxBank = 35π/180. We assume a pair of aircraft, one labeled evader and the other intruder. The evader represents an aircraft flying on normal conditions while the intruder represents a blundering aircraft. In the case of the AILS algorithm, each aircraft runs the alerting logic twice: the first execution treats the local aircraft (ownship) as the evader and the traffic aircraft as the intruder; the second execution interchanges the roles of intruder and evader aircraft. In this paper, we will consider the evader to be the ownship. Multiple aircraft scenarios are handled by sequential compositions of pair-wise aircraft conflict detection algorithms. Notice that, in contrast to conflict detection, conflict resolution for multiple aircraft system is not compositional because a pair of aircraft could create new conflicts for previously solved aircraft. Conflict resolution is beyond the scope of this paper.
Equations (1)- (4) apply to both evader and intruder aircraft. State functions representing the state of the evader and intruder aircraft are subscripted with lowercase letters e and i, respectively. The AILS algorithm assumes that only one aircraft is diverting from its intended landing path. This assumption was made by the designers of the AILS system. It is based on a probabilistic failure assessment. Hence, an additional restriction is imposed on evader trajectories by constraining the bank angle φ e (t) = 0. This constraint makes the heading of the evader constant and its trajectory a straight line. Without loss of generality, we chose a coordinate system where the x-axis coincides with the evader trajectory making the heading angle of the evader aircraft always 0. Thus, the equations for the evader can be rephrased and integrated x e (t) = X e + v e t y e (t) = Y e θ e (t) = 0 φ e (t) = 0
where X e and Y e are the coordinates of the initial evader position.
In [9] , Kuchar and Yang characterize three kinds of trajectory models: nominal, worst-case, and probabilistic. In the nominal approach, the future aircraft state, i.e., position, speed, heading, bank angle, is projected from the current state according to physical laws. In the worstcase approach, the future state is projected by following a policy of extreme values for specific state variables. In a probabilistic model, uncertainties such as weather conditions or extrapolation errors are taken into account to calculate the most probable aircraft trajectories. In our case, we quantify over all physically possible trajectories. Hence, all these kind of trajectories are just particular cases of our definition.
Formal development
We have modeled the motion of aircraft by differentiable functions in R → R. Higher-order logic is particularly suitable for this model, since it allows for trajectories as parameters and results of expressions.
To establish the basic properties of trajectories, we need several lemmas that concern differentiable functions, coordinate systems, and objects in motion in general. We present in this section the main aspects of this development.
Elementary differential calculus
Like most theorem provers, PVS has little automated support for non-linear arithmetic and real analysis. We have extended the pre-defined theory of real numbers and the theory of differential functions developed in [2] with theories dealing with trigonometric and other transcendental functions.
Non-constructive real functions are declared in PVS as uninterpreted functions. Their behavior is given axiomatically. For example, cos and sin are functions from reals to the real interval [−1 . . . 1] satisfying, among other properties, sin(a) 2 + cos(b) 2 = 1. In a similar way, √ . is a function from non-negative reals to non-negative reals such that √ a 2 = a for a ≥ 0. From this axiom, we can prove, for instance, that √ a 2 = a for a ≥ 0. The concepts of differentiability and derivative are treated the same way. In PVS, we define Differentiable as an uninterpreted predicate over functions in R → R. The uninterpreted higher-order function D (for derivative) maps differentiable functions to functions in R → R. Typical axioms assert, for example, that sin is differentiable and that its derivative is cos. In our proofs, we have managed to avoid the concept of differentiability over an interval. For instance, the square root function is not assumed to be differentiable, but we have used an axiom stating that for all differentiable functions f mapping real numbers to positive real numbers, the function x → f (x) is differentiable. 0000 0000 0000 1111 1111 1111 00 00 11 11
The area is smaller than the area Another important property defining the concept of derivative is the following theorem of calculus, which is illustrated in Fig. 1 :
In the verification process it is sometimes necessary to perform calculations on expressions containing uninterpreted functions such as sin and cos. It is tempting to use approximation series to define them. However, mixing approximation series and axiomatic definitions can be a source of paradoxes. Let us say for example that sin and cos compute approximate values of sine and cosine, respectively. In this case, it is possible to find a real number a such that sin(a) 2 + cos(a) 2 evaluates to a real number close to, but different from 1. In order to avoid these kinds of inconsistencies, we mix approximations and uninterpreted functions in a very rigorous way. Assume we want to prove that e 1 
Most of the times, (5) and (7) 
and the axioms:
3.14 ≤ π ≤ 3.15.
Axiom 2 (SIN)
0 ≤ a ≤ π ⇒ sin lb (a) ≤ sin(a) ≤ sin ub (a).
Axiom 3 (COS)
The presence of many axioms in this section reflects our focus on developing proofs of properties of conflict detection algorithms using well-known results of calculus, rather than on developing a calculus library. Currently, these uninterpreted constants are being replaced by definitions and these axioms are becoming theorems.
Geometry
An important technique used in our formal development is to take as reference a new system of coordinates where the origin is the position of the evader aircraft at a given time T , i.e., (x e (T ), y e (T )), and the x-y plane has been rotated by θ i (0) degrees. We recall that θ i (0) is the heading of the intruder aircraft at time 0. The newx-ŷ plane, is defined as follows:
We have formally proved several properties related to changes of coordinate systems. For instance, Lemma isometric states that distances are invariant under rotation and translation of the coordinate system.
Lemma 1 (isometric)
.
Kinematics
Let us now turn to the lemmas that involve moving objects. These lemmas were needed to prove safety properties of the AILS algorithm, but they are still rather general and some of them have been reused to prove properties of other air traffic control algorithms [6] . The first example concerns the characterization of converging and diverging aircraft trajectories via the time of closest separation between two straight-line trajectories. If the evader aircraft is assumed to have heading 0 and the intruder aircraft has heading θ, then the equations defining the projected trajectories are:
x e (t) = x e (0) + v e t y e (t) = y e (0)
and the distance between the projected trajectories at time t, R(t), can be computed as follows:
To find the minimum of R(t), first the derivative of R(t) is computed:
where
We have formally verified that when R (t + τ ) = 0, the time τ , relative to t, is the time of closest separation between the aircraft. The solution to this equation is:
. Converging tracks
It is important to note that τ is undefined, i.e., denominator is zero, when the aircraft are parallel and the ground speeds are equal. For any time t, if τ (t) is negative or zero, the tracks are diverging or parallel, respectively. If τ (t) is greater than zero, the tracks are converging and τ (t) is the time of closest separation relative to t. The case of converging tracks is illustrated in Fig. 2 . In PVS:
Lemma 2 (derivative_eq_zero_min).
Lemma 3 (asymptotic_decrease_tau).
Lemma 4 (asymptotic_increase_tau).
A second example concerns the maximum and minimum distance traveled by an aircraft in a given time whose speed is constant and bank angle bounded. In particular, vt is the farthest distance, i.e., via straight line, that can be reached by an aircraft moving at constant speed v in t s. That property is called YCNGFTYS, which stands for You Cannot Go Faster Than Your Speed, and it has been formally verified in PVS.
Theorem 2 (YCNGFTYS
For an aircraft moving at constant speed v and with a constant bank angle φ the distance from the position at time 0 to the position at time t is given by the formula
where r(v, φ) is the turn radius of the aircraft. See Fig. 3 . The turn radius r(v, φ) can be calculated as follows:
Fig. 3. Distance traveled in curved trajectory
Thus,
According to (4), the maximum change of heading per second of an aircraft moving at constant speed v is given by
From (9) and (10):
and from (8) and (11):
When 0 ≤ ρ(v)t ≤ 2, we have formally verified in PVS that m(v, MaxBank, t) is the minimum distance traveled by an aircraft moving at constant speed v in t s 1 . The property is called YCNGSTYS, which stands for You Cannot Go Slower Than Your Speed.
Theorem 3 (YCNGSTYS
According to theorems YCNGFTYS (Theorem 2) and YCNGSTYS (Theorem 3), for an aircraft moving at constant ground speed v, the inner circle of radius m(v, MaxBank, t) 1 We conjecture that the property still holds for 0 ≤ ρ(v)t ≤ 2π; however, we could not find a formal proof of this proposition. and the outer circle of radius vt, both centered at the current position of the aircraft, delimit the area that could be reached by the aircraft flying continuously during t units of time.
Verification of the AILS alerting algorithm
The AILS system enables independent parallel landings to closely spaced parallel runways during reduced visibility conditions. An integral part of the system is the alerting algorithm which provides a sequence of alarms when the aircraft are diverting from their intended landing paths. The original AILS algorithm was written in FORTRAN at the NASA Langley Research Center. It has been revised several times and the latest version, flown in the Boeing 757 experimental aircraft, was written by Honeywell. The AILS alerting system is a multilevel alarm system, i.e., it provides several levels of alarms ranging from advisory cautions to traffic warnings, according to the severity of the predicted miss-approach. A traffic warning must be followed by an evader escape maneuver. For the work presented in this paper, we use a high-level abstract model of the AILS alerting algorithm, written in PVS and described in [4] , where only traffic warning alarms are considered.
In PVS, the AILS alerting algorithm is specified by a predicate ails_alert that takes the initial measured states of intruder and evader aircraft, and returns true or false depending on whether the traffic alarm is issued or not. The specification of the algorithm is almost a one-toone translation of the original FORTRAN code with the exception of DO-LOOPS statements that are translated using recursive definitions.
In our approach of verification of hybrid systems, the physical environment is modeled using continuous mathematics and the algorithm is modeled using discrete logics. As we said before, both models are specified in the PVS higher-order logic formalism. Discrete and continuous models are related via a measurement or sampling function that takes snap-shots at time intervals of the physical environment and provides inputs to the discrete algorithm. In PVS, a trajectory is represented by a record type Trajectory with fields θ, x, y, φ, which are continuous and differentiable functions in R → R. The notion of measurement is formalized as a function that takes a trajectory tr and a time t, and returns a record of type State with fields x, y, heading, and bank such that 2 x(measure2state(tr, t)) = x(t) y(measure2state(tr, t)) = y(t) heading(measure2state(tr, t)) = θ(t) bank(measure2state(tr, t)) = φ(t).
Note that we do not consider measurement errors. However, they can be handled as follows:
x(measure2state(tr, t)) = x(t) + ε x y(measure2state(tr, t)) = y(t) + ε y heading(measure2state(tr, t)) = θ(t) + ε θ bank(measure2state(tr, t)) = φ(t) + ε φ where the ε's are bounded according to the error inaccuracies of measurement devices. Henceforth, i and e will denote intruder and evader continuous aircraft trajectories, respectively.
Conflict detection
Conflict detection is based on the ability to predict future aircraft locations for a given lookahead time. Two types of information can be used for prediction: (1) intent information for long-to-medium lookahead times, e.g., hours or several minutes; and (2) state information for medium-toshort lookahead times, e.g., a few minutes or seconds. Intent information refers to information in flight plans, destination, in route way points, estimated time of arrival, etc. In contrast, state-based prediction refers to the exclusive use of an airplane state: location and speed vector, to determine future trajectories. In this paper, we are only concerned with trajectory prediction based on state information. We say that two aircraft have a (potential) conflict at time T > 0, if there exists state-based projected trajectories for the aircraft leading to a distance between them less than a given value ConflictRange at time T . Formally, conflict ie (T ) = (x i (T ) − x e (T )) 2 + (y i (T ) − y e (T )) 2 < ConflictRange.
Assuming that aircraft have reliable access to accurate data flight information, two key properties that must be established for a conflict detection algorithm are: (1) any potential conflict within the lookahead time will be detected; and (2) a conflict detection reflects a potential conflict within the lookahead time. The first property is called correctness and the latter one is certainty. Correctness means that conflicts will not go undetected and certainty means that the algorithm will not detect conflicts that do not exist, possibly leading to false alarms. Since potential conflicts that are not detected may lead to mid-air collisions, correctness is a much more critical feature, from a safety point of view, than certainty. However, false alarms will have negative effects both on safety and in the overall performance of the airspace system [8] .
AILS Correctness
Our attempts to prove the correctness property of the AILS alerting algorithm for T = 19 s, which is the original lookahead time of the algorithm, failed. Indeed it is not provable for times greater than 10.5 s. We have found that there exist intruder and evader trajectories which will bring the two aircraft within 10.5 s of a conflict without an alarm being issued. This counter-example yields the following theorem.
Theorem 4 (ails_incorrectness).
∃ i, e : Trajectory. conflict ie (10.5) ∧ ¬ails_alert(measure2state(i, 0), measure2state(e, 0)).
To prove the correctness property for T ≤ 10 s, it is sufficient to prove that if a conflict may occur in a time ranging between 9.5 s and 10 s then an alarm is issued. Indeed, it can be easily proved, for example using an inductive argument, that the property also holds for times less than 9.5 s, given the operational constraint that when the AILS system is first engaged during a final approach, there is a safe window of at least 9.5 s where no conflict can occur. We have the following correctness theorem:
measure2state(e, 0)).
The proof proceeds by proving independently that: (1) if a conflict may occur in a time ranging between 9.5 s and 10 s, then the aircraft are in a certain time-space region G; and (2) if they are in this region G, then an alarm is issued. The proof of (1) involves only the geometry and the kinematics of the physical environment, while the second proof concerns only the specification of the algorithm. The region G constitutes the interface between the two proofs, in the same way as the measured state is the interface between the algorithm and its physical environment.
More precisely, the first lemma proves that if a conflict may occur, then:
1. The distance of the initial position of the intruder to the final position of the evader ranges between MinDistance and MaxDistance that are the minimum and the maximum distances an aircraft may run in a time ranging between 9.5 s and 10 s (as determined by Theorems 2 and 3); 2. The initial heading of the intruder also ranges between two bounds; 3. The aircraft are converging at current time, i.e., τ (0) > 0.
In this last case, we have to prove that if the aircraft are diverging at current time, although the intruder can change heading, it cannot do it sufficiently fast to create a conflict. The second lemma proves that the AILS algorithm issues an alarm if all these conditions hold.
It is important to note that what we have shown for 9.5 s ≤ T ≤ 10 s is a worst case scenario. In simulations with actively flying airline pilots, it was found that the pilot reaction time was in average approximately 2 s. In addition, according to the logic of the AILS alerting system, the intruder aircraft should receive two path deviation indications and one traffic caution indication before the evader aircraft is alerted.
AILS Uncertainty
Finally, we have also proved that although the AILS algorithm is correct, it is not certain, i.e., it may issue false alarms.
Theorem 6 (ails_uncertainty). For all T ∈ R, if 0 < T ≤ 10, then ∃ s i , s e : State. ∀ i, e : Trajectory.
To prove this theorem, we first found by simulation, states of intruder and evader aircraft that issue an alarm, but where the aircraft cannot conflict within 10 s. These states were then used to instantiate the existential quantifier in the theorem.
Incorrectness and uncertainty
In general, a correctly designed alerting algorithm will have a response curve similar to that of Fig. 4 , where T 1 is the largest time-to-conflict where the algorithm alerts 100% of the conflicts and T 2 is the shortest time-toconflict where no alarm is issued. The algorithm and the physical system define the steepness and shape of the curve. Ideally, an alerting algorithm will have a step response with T 1 > 0 and T 1 = T 2 . In practice, the latter condition is impossible to achieve for most physical systems. Algorithm designers must strike a balance between total coverage at time T 1 and absence of false alarms at time T 2 . Moving the curve to the right by increasing T 2 could result in an excessive number of false alarms. Moving the curve to the left could result in unsafe conditions. Values for times T 1 and T 2 are in general approximated using testing and simulation, since it is very difficult to give an analytical formula to describe the curve.
When we started the verification of the AILS algorithm, we did not know, and neither the designers of the system, whether T 1 existed or not, i.e., a time-to-conflict where the algorithm achieved 100 per cent coverage. Via simulation, we have found that the AILS alerting algorithm does not achieve 100% coverage for a time of 10.5 s (Theorem 4). In other words, if T 1 existed, it was strictly less than 10.5 s. The correctness theorem gives a definitive bound to T 1 , it states that 10 s ≤ T 1 . It should be noted that simulation cannot be used to find a lower bound for T 1 since this involves a universal quantification over all possible trajectories leading to conflict. Since the timestep of the algorithm is half a second, the value of T 1 has been found to be in the rage of 10 s ≤ T 1 < 10.5 s.
Conflict detection algorithms do not look for conflicts after the lookahead time. Hence, in the case of AILS we knew that T 2 ≤ 19 s. Furthermore, the uncertainty theorem tell us that 10 s < T 2 . We did not try to find a better upper bound for T 2 .
The values of T 1 and T 2 depend, of course, on the parameters of the AILS algorithm. In particular, a larger T 1 can be achieved by increasing the value of the parameter of the alert range which sets a boundary on the minimal distance to issue an alert between the evader and intruder aircraft. This parameter is also a parameter in the verification. It could be modified and most of the formal development would remain unchanged. A few lemmas, those involving algorithm details, would require adjustments. On the other hand, we have identified a piece of code of the AILS algorithm that was unnecessary to achieve correctness. This means that all the alarms issued in this part of the code were alarms that we classify as false alarms. However, false alarms are sometimes a feature, not a bug. For example, they are used to avoid nearmisses produced by the inaccuracies of the measurement devices.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a new approach for verifying the safety of conflict detection algorithms that may one day be deployed in the national airspace. Such algorithms are an enabling technology for Free Flight, where pilots are allowed to fly their own preferred trajectories. The introduction of these algorithms in a Free Flight context raises significant safety issues. Historically, the trajectories of aircraft have been managed by ground controllers through use of aircraft position data obtained from radar. Under this approach, the primary responsibility for maintaining aircraft separation has been borne by the air traffic controller. However, under a Free-Flight approach, much of the responsibility for maintaining separation will be transferred to the pilots and the software which provides them traffic information, i.e., via Cockpit Display of Traffic Information (CDTI), and warnings of potential conflicts. We believe that current methods for gaining assurance about the safety of ground-based decision-aid software are inadequate for many of the software systems that will be deployed in the future in support of Free Flight. The current approach is based upon human-factors experimentation using high fidelity simulations. In the current approach, where the responsibility for safety resides in the human controller, this is clearly the right approach. The primary question to be answered is whether the software provides the controllers with useful information that aids them in their decision making. However, as software takes on more and more of the responsibility for generating aircraft trajectories and detecting potential conflicts and perhaps even producing (and executing?) the evasive maneuvers, we will need additional tools to guarantee safety. It is our view that it is essential that the correctness of the algorithm be established for all possible situations. Simulation and testing cannot accomplish this. Although simulation and controlled experimentation are clearly necessary, they are not sufficient to guarantee safety. This can only be done by analytical means, i.e., formal verification. We should also note that it will also be necessary to demonstrate that the implementation of these algorithms in software is correct. This refinement verification, in our view, must also be accomplished using formal methods.
Air traffic systems falls into the domain of hybrid systems. The hybrid nature of this domain makes the verification problem especially difficult. Automatic methods such as model checking cannot directly handle the continuous trajectories, i.e., infinite state space, and discretization leads to unacceptable errors. We are forced to reason about such systems in the context of a fully general theorem prover designed to handle a rich logic such as higherorder logic, type theory, or ZFC set theory. We have used the PVS theorem prover in our work and found this tool to be sufficient to handle this problem domain, but our work was often impeded by PVS's baroque method for dealing with non-linear arithmetic. Although PVS provides a suite of decision procedures that automate much of the tedium of theorem prover, in this arena, one must wrestle with the prover in order to make progress. Adding capability for reasoning about formulas containing nonlinear arithmetic in theorem provers is a current area of research [12] .
The trajectory model used in this paper is the result of investigating different approaches. Earlier work looked at more discrete versions with the expectation that this would lead to a more tractable verification task.
Completely discrete models of trajectories, which was hoped to lead to automated verification techniques such as model checking, resulted in inaccurate and erroneous results. A semi-discrete model, one in which time is discrete and state variables are continuous, with the accuracy necessary to yield correct results, was extremely difficult to verify. For example, the proof of the safety property (Theorem 4) for the semi-discrete model was a 6 person-months effort [4] . The continuous model presented in this paper, where trajectories are differentiable functions over real numbers, reduced the proof effort of Theorem 4 to 2 person-months. Overall, the authors have spent approximately 2 person-years in the analysis of conflict detection algorithms, development of libraries for real analysis in higher-order logic, implementation of prototypes, and other infrastructure needed for this work. To give a rough idea of the size of the verification, AILS-related theories are approximately 3500 lines of PVS, containing more than 500 lemmas, and 15 000 lines of proof code (one line is more or less one proof-step). These libraries and infrastructure should facilitate future work in this area and the libraries are freely available to other users working in modeling of hybrid systems.
There are several possible extensions to the formalism presented in this paper. In particular, we are currently working on conflict resolution (in addition to conflict detection) in a 3-D geometry [6] . Other features, such as multiple aircraft situations and aircraft data measurement errors, are planned as near future work. In the long term, we will concentrate on applying this modeling framework to other air traffic management concepts such as self-spacing and merging. These concepts are designed to increase capacity in the terminal area. Finally, all this work must be generalized to cover the notion of airspace density (static or dynamic). This is a necessary step towards developing formal methods useful for the design and implementation of new air traffic management systems.
